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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.

Case No.

JUAN P. JARAMILLO,

1'2259

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The defendant-appellant, Juan P. Jaramillo, is appealing from a conviction by jury of robbery in violation of
Utah Code Ann., § 76-51-1 ( 1953), in the Third Judicial
District in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, Ji1dge, pnsiding.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant was found guilty hy jury of the crime of
robbery as charged and was sentenced to the Utah State
Prison for an indeterminate term a;:; prescribed by iaw, the
sentence being five years to life, pursuant to Utah Code
Ann.,§ 76-51-2 (1953).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent asks this court to affirm the appellant's conviction.
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STATEMENT

or

FACTS

Appellant was charged with the crime of robbery (R.
7). He originally pleaded not guilty, putting the burden
on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the
elements of the crime as charged. Shortly thereafter, he
withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a guilty plea
and waived time for passing of sentence. He was sentenced
for the indeterminate term as provided by law (R. 14). He
served approximately twenty-seven and one-half months
in prison and then was allowed to replead, pursuant to
Judge A. Sherman Christensen's memorandum decision
dateJ April 23, 1970, on the grounds his guilty plea was not
valid.
Thereafter, appellant pleaded not guilty and was convicted by jury trial. The court imposed an indeterminate
term 2.s provided by statute (R. 4~).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUBMIT EVIDENCE OF FORMER JEOPARDY TO THE
JURY, NOR DID THE COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE ISSUE
OF FORMER JEOPARDY, BECAUSE AS A
MATTER OF LAW THE NEW TRIAL WAS
NOT DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
Appellant argues that the issue of once in jeopardy is
one of fact for the jury. Appella:nt's Brief at 5. He can-
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not prevail on that ai·gument, bc;:ause his new trial atter
he had suc:ceeded in havmg his original sentence set aside,
was not double jeopardy. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U. S. 711, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) · United States v. Ewell,
383 U. S. 116, 86 S. Ct. 773 ( 1960); United States v. Tateo,
377 U. S.16:1, 84 S. Ct. 1587 (1964).

"l W Jhen a defendant <'btains a reversal of a
prior, unsatisfied conviction, he may be refried in
the normal course of events.' United States v. Ewell,
supra, at 121.
"The Fifth Amendme~~t provide::; that no 'person l shall] be subject for the same offense to be
twice, put in jeopardy of liff' and limb . . . . ' The
principle that this provision does not preclude tlle
Government's retrying a defendant whose conviction is set aside because of an error in the proceer1ings leading to conviction fr: a well established part
of our constitutional jurisprudence." United States
v. Tateo, supra, at 465.
Furthermore, even though our statute provides that
" [a] n issue of fact arises . . . [ u] pon a plea of once in
jeopardy," Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-1 (1953), the trial
court as a matter of law may find there is not a double
jeopardy issue, and refuse to submit th~t "issue" to the
jury. California, which has an ioentical provision in its
penal code, Deering's California Code, Penal, § 1041 (1961),
has so held. In People v. Greer, 184 P. 2d 512 (Cal. 1947),
the court said:
" [ T] he plea of double jeopardy does not necessarily require a finding by the jury but may require
a conclusion of law by th~ trial court. [Citations
omitted.] If, as a matter of law, the previous prose-
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cution could not constitute double jeopa ,·du, the frial
court 'lS not required to s11l:m·it tlie r;11estio11 to the
jury for a finding upon tha,t plea." Id. at 516. (Emphasis added.)
V.

The Arizona Supreme Court has held likewise. State
Woodring, 386 P. 2d 851 (Ariz. 1963).

The law is the same in Utah. The court does not have
to present the issue of double jeopardy to the jury. In
State v. Mcinty1·e, 92 U. 177 (1987), the appellant complained that the trial court had iefused ~.o allow the jury
to consider evidence concerning f0~·mer jeopardy, purusant
to the Utah Statutes. The court in that case stated:
"The defendant has the burden of proving his
plea of ... former jeopardy, and the question as to
whether he has offered sufficient evidence to raise
an issue of fact upon which a jury can pass is a
question of law for th~ court. Id. at 185.
"In that regard a plea of former jeopardy ...
differs from a plea of not guilty. A defendant is
presumed innocent until the state, which has the
burden of proof to the contrary, has established his
guilt to the statisfaction of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt . . . On a plea of ... forrner .ieopardy.
there is no presumption in favor of defendant. He
has the burden of proof and unless he offers evidence which raises an issue of fact, the court should
not submit the matter to the jury." Id. at 186. (Emphasis added.)
POINT II.
THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR IN IMPOSING AN INDETERMINATE TERM WITHOUT SUBTRACTING THEREFROM THE PER-
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5
lOD OF APPELLANT'S PRIOR IMPRISONMENT.

Appellant argues that when the tnal court imposed
his present sentence, the time previously spent in prison
was not credited to him, and thereiore the court erred. He
cites North Carolina v. Pearce, ~>95 U. S. 711 (1969) to
support his contention.
Appellant has not properly expressed the icsue in
Pearce. He points out in his brief at page 6 that Mr. Pearce
was tried and sentenced, and then retried and resentenced.
The second sentence, when added to the time already served,
amounted to a longer sentence than had been imposed at
Pearce's first trial. The stricter sentence on retrial presented one issue in that case, but is not the same issue
appellant raises in case at bar. Pearce had been credited
at his second sentencing with ·~he time he had already
served. However, Rice, whose matter before the Supreme
Court was also decided in North Carolina v. Pearce, supra,
did raise the issue whether in c0mputing a new sentence
after retrial, credit must be given for time already served,
which is the issue appellant in case at bar does raise.
Rice received a sentence of 25 years on his retrial, but
had served two and one-half year::;, pursuant t0 hrn mitial
10 year sentence for which he hac! receivt~d no credit. The
Court held "that the Constitutional guarantee against multitiple punishments for the same offense absolutely requires
that punishment already exacted must be fully 'credited'
in imposing sentence upon a new conviction for same
offense." Id. at 718.
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t)

Hcwcn;r, PeaFcc, supra, clo~s not h~lp the appellant
in case at bar because appellant here does not come under
the Pearce ruling.
In case at bar, appellant was not sentenced to a definite term, as was Rice, from whicl1 the court could nicely
subtract the time he had already E-pent in prison. His stat.
utory sentence is five years to life; how could the court
have subtracted twenty-seven and one-half months from a
life sentence? However, that docs not mean the time appellant has been in prison will be "wiped off the slate."
Concerning sentencing, our sta.tute provides:
"Whenever any person is convicted ... ar:d the
judgment provides for p:mishment in the state
prison, the court shall not fix a definite term of imprisonment; but the sentence and judgment of imprisonment in the state prison shall be for a period
of time not less than the minimum and not to exceed
the maximum term provided by law . . .'' Utah
Code Ann., § 77-35-20 (Supp. 1963).
Under this indeterminate sentence law, the tnal court
does not impose a definite sentence, and the sentence is
construed as a sentence for the maximum period prescribed,
"subject to the right of the Board of Pardons to determine
the release date of the convicted person from incarceration." State v. Bassett, 14 U. 2d M2, 414 (1963).
The Board of Pardons has the duty to determine "when
and under what conditions . . . [prisoners] . . . may be re·
leased upon parole, pardoned, ... or [have] their sentences
commuted or terminated.
" Utah Code Ann., § 77-62·
3(a) (1953).
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The Board of Pardons, in dealmg with a prisor.er sentenced to an indeterminate term i eceives information from
the judge and prosecuting attorne.: setting forth, inter alia,
"any ... information that will ai<f the board of pardons in
passing upon the application for the termination or commutation of such sentence, or fo parole pardon." Utah
Code Ann.,§ 77-62-8(c) (1953).
1•

Since the trial court could not have subtracted the
twenty-seven and one-half months from a life sentence, and
the indeterminate sentence here i::; construed as a life sentence, State v. Bassett, supra, the issue of whether appellant has not been credited for time already served is not
presently before the court.
If the Board of Pardons dues not consider the time

appellant served prior to his present sentence, the issue
then might come before the cour4: State v. Perfetto, _____ _
U. 2d ______ (Case No. 11914, Oct. 1970).
Appellant also argues that the court below erred in not
subtracting from his sentence the time spent in jail prior
to trial, and that therefore his sentence was prolonged on
the grounds he had no money to pay bail. The United States
Supreme Court held in Williams v. Illinois, 90 S. Ct. 2018,
2023 (1970), "that the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that the statutory ceiling placed on imprisonment for any
substantive offense be the same for all defendants irrespective of their economic status." Neither the holding nor the
unf!erlying policy in Williams was violate:l in case at bar.
The trial court did not extend appellant's sentence as much
as one second on the ground he did not make baii.
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CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that thi.:; Court should atfirm
judgment and sentence of the court below.

~he

The trial judge did not err in refusing to allow the
issue of former jeopardy to go tv the jury, nor did the
court below err in imposing the statutory indeterminate
sentence without subtracting therefrom the time appellant
already had spent imprisoned.
None of appellant's statutory nor constitutional rights
were violated.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney General
A ltorneys for Respondent
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